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ABSTRACT
MONETARY POLICY WITH A FISCAL CONSTRAINT
Özcan, Sait Sinan
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ümit Özlale
September 2004
The theme of fiscal dominance on monetary policy is an old issue. Basically, in an
environment of high debt and high risk premium, inflation targeting does not work well.
Higher interest rates lead to higher debt, a higher risk premium, a depreciation, and so, to a
higher inflation. In this study, we analyze the influence of fiscal constraints on pursuing
monetary policy from the perspective of the risk premium. We use the monthly data of the
last three years of the Turkish economy. We obtain the feedback rules for the interest rates by
minimizing the loss functions, which include inflation, output gap, and interest rate smoothing
as the goal variables. According to the rule obtained under weak fiscal conditions, we observe
the negative response of interest rate to inflation, which is the opposite of the rule obtained in
absence of high risk premium and debt burden.
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ÖZET
MALİ KISITLAR ALTINDA PARA POLİTİKASI
Özcan, Sait Sinan
Master, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ümit Özlale
Eylül 2004
Mali durumun para politikalarına olan baskın konumu bilinen bir konudur. Kısaca, yüksek
borç yükünün ve risk priminin olduğu bir ekonomide enflasyon hedeflemesi amacına
ulaşamamaktadır. Böyle bir ortamda, faiz oranlarının artırılması, sırasıyla borç yükünü, risk
primini, devalüasyonu ve sonunda da enflasyonu körüklemektedir. Bu çalışmada, mali
kısıtların para politikasına olan etkisi risk primi perspektifinden incelenmektedir. Bunun için
Türkiye’nin son üç yıldaki aylık ekonomik verileri kullanılmıştır. Enflasyon, cari açık ve faiz
oranları farkından oluşan kayıp fonksiyonlarının minimize edilmesiyle, durum değişkenlerine
bağlı optimal faiz oranları elde edilmiştir. Zayıf mali koşullar göz önüne alındığında, optimal
faiz oranının enflasyonla ters orantılı olduğu gözlemlenirken, mali kısıtlar göz ardı
edildiğinde elde edilen faiz kuralında bu durumun tam ters olduğu görülmüştür.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For emerging market economies several financial variables, such as the exchange rate,
fluctuate in parallel with the risk premium. One reason is the capital flows: an increase
in the risk premium leads to a sudden drop of capital flows and to a depreciation,
needed to generate the trade surplus required to offset the decrease in capital flows. On
the other hand, fluctuations in the exchange rate induce corresponding fluctuations in
the ratio of public debt to GDP. This happens mainly because of the high proportion of
dollar denominated debt in the emerging markets.
Domestic interest rates are also affected by fluctuations in the risk premium. In the
case of policy rates for the short-run, the mechanism is mostly via the exchange rates:
risk premium generates exchange rate fluctuations, which in turn move inflation
expectations, and the central bank decides on the policy interest rate according to this
newly formed expectations.
2In the long run, domestic rates are affected by the risk premium in two ways:
indirectly, through the policy interest rate, as mentioned above, because fluctuations in
the policy rate move the term structure; and directly because the price of financial
instruments of longer maturities reflect interest rate risk, term premium and default
risk. Therefore, as a result, the cost of servicing the public debt fluctuates very closely
with the risk premium, both in the short and the long run.
Alternatively, Calvo (2002) observed that risk premium is rather correlated with
international factors, especially with worldwide measures of investors’ desire for risk,
such as the spread between US corporate bonds and US Treasuries. Indeed, Calvo
suggests that once one accounts for the US corporate spread, domestic factors appear
to be irrelevant while explaining the risk premium. Therefore, his views about the
determination of risk premium is different than the ones which stress the importance
of exchange rate and public debt in analyzing the risk premium.
In attempt to combine these two distinct views about risk premium, Favero and
Giavazzi (2003) presents an evidence for Calvo’s observation, conforming that the
Brazilian risk premium is correlated with the US corporate spread, but with some
contribution: This correlation is not constant over time, but depends on the state of
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, especially fiscal fundamentals. This inference
has important implications especially while designing monetary policy in emerging
markets. There may be two different monetary policy regimes depending on the state
of fiscal policy. In the good one, the risk premium is low and monetary policy works
3in the usual way. However, when fiscal fundamentals are weak, the risk premium is
high and economy may shift to a bad equilibrium due to the perverse effects of the
monetary policy.
The following scenario happens to be in action in case of implication of monetary
policy in a bad equilibrium: with a public debt of short maturity, an increase in the
policy interest rate raises the cost of debt service. When the primary budget deficit is
fixed, the rise of the debt level triggers the risk premium. This increase in the risk adds
to the initial increase in debt, especially if it is accompanied by a depreciation of the
exchange rate, which raises the dollar-denominated bonds in terms of domestic GDP.
The depreciation affects inflation expectations as well and, eventually, inflation itself.
This induces central bank to increase the policy interest rate further, which further
triggers the cost of debt service, and so on.
4In the light of the above mentioned views, the purpose of this study is to analyze the
effects of fiscal constraints on pursuing monetary policy from the perspective of the
risk premium. We choose Turkish economy as our case study because of the reasons
explained below. First, we minimize loss functions by modeling the economy only
with standard inflation and output specifications. In the second case, in order to make
a comparison, equations representing the fiscal constraints such as risk premium and
ratio of debt over GDP are added to the model. According to the feedback rules
obtained from these two different cases we analyze the implications of fiscal
dominance on monetary policy. As a result we find that under weak fiscal conditions,
the conditional monetary policy methods do not produce expected consequences.
Indeed they have perverse effects under high risk premium and debt burden.
5CHAPTER II
EMERGING MARKET CASES
In the following sections, we give two case studies. We simply present the Brazilian
and Turkish economies as the emerging market cases.
II.1. Brazil: A Case Study
Favero and Giavazzi (2003) estimate a simple model of the Brazilian economy which
focuses on a few variables such as the Embi spread, which is a proxy for risk
premium, the exchange rate, domestic interest rates, inflation, the survey-based
measure of inflation expectations and the dynamics of the public debt. Using this
model, they estimate the threshold beyond which the economy might fall into a bad
equilibrium: they find that this corresponds to a level of the ratio of the net public debt
to GDP. They also analyze the dynamics of the main variables in the bad equilibrium.
6Favero and Giavazzi find that in Brazil, inflation expectations are very sticky.
Therefore one of the main channels of the interaction between debt and inflation in the
fiscal theory is hampered. In absence of fiscal stabilization, an increase in the interest
rates triggers inflation through the channel of risk premium, which is the effect of
credit risk and term premium responding to a monetary tightening and finally
determining the dynamics of the public debt.
Calvo (2002) stresses on the importance of the worldwide measures of the investors’
appetite for risk, such as the spread between US corporate bonds and US Treasuries, in
explaining the Brazilian component of the Embi spread. Favero and Giavazzi (2003)
observes in Brazil that there is a steady increase in the debt-GDP ratio, partly because
the primary surplus, though rising, has never been sufficient to stabilize the debt, in
part because, over time, the government has recognized the hidden liabilities
especially in the balance sheets of state-owned banks. Therefore the debt level seems
to be a factor influencing the response of the Brazilian risk premium to international
factors.
Favero and Giavazzi (2003) state that an unsustainable fiscal policy may hinder the
effectiveness of monetary policy, to the point that an increase can have a perverse
effect on inflation. It is shown that term premium and credit risk reinforce the
possibility that a vicious circle might arise, making the fiscal conditions on monetary
policy more effective. The experience of Brazil shows how critical the behavior of
fiscal policy is. During 2002, Brazil had probably fallen into a bad equilibrium, where
7fiscal policy was preventing the effectiveness of monetary policy. However, a small
change in the fiscal rule, such as that announced by the new administration in January
2003, has been enough to bring the economy back to normal conditions, and rapidly
stabilize the spread, the exchange rate, and through these two variables, inflation
expectations, inflation and the dynamics of the public debt.
Blanchard (2003) also studies a similar subject and analyzes the fiscal dominance on
inflation targeting. In 2002, the increasing probability that Lula would be elected led
to a serious macroeconomic crisis in Brazil. The rate of interest on Brazilian
government dollar denominated debt increased sharply, revealing an increase in the
market’s assessment of the risk of default. The real exchange rate depreciated sharply
against dollar, leading to an increase in inflation. The central bank committed to
inflation targeting, and sharply increased the interest rate. The combination of dollar
debt and depreciation on the one hand, and sharply increased interest rates on the
other, led to government debt dynamics which seemed increasingly difficult to control,
further increasing the risk premium. This crisis has subsided as follows: The
commitment to a high target for the primary surplus, together with the announcement
of a reform of the retirement system, have steadily improved the fiscal outlook over
the short and medium run, leading to a decrease in default risk, an appreciation of the
real exchange rate, and a decrease in inflation. According to Blanchard (2003), there
are a number of lessons to be learned. The one, which has to do with the monetary
policy is that, in an environment of high debt, inflation targeting may not work well,
or in fact may not work at all. Higher interest rates may lead to higher debt, a higher
8risk of default, a depreciation, and so, to a higher inflation. Bad fiscal conditions may
dominate the conventional methods. The evidence shows that in 2002 and 2003 Brazil
was in such a condition of this kind, so that, the way to fight inflation is through fiscal
policy, not through monetary policy. Fortunately, this appears to be exactly what is
happening in Brazil today.
Blanchard discusses the case of taking the influence of interest rate on probability of
default on government debt into account. He points out two channels through which
the interest rate leads to a decrease in inflation. First, the higher interest rate decreases
demand, output, and in turn inflation. Second, the higher interest rate leads to an
exchange rate appreciation, which decreases inflation, both directly and indirectly
through the induced decrease in demand and output. Blanchard states that in case of
bad fiscal conditions such as high overall debt, and risk aversion, an increase in the
interest rate leads to a depreciation, rather than an appreciation. Basically, if in
response to inflation, the central bank increases the interest rate and that increase leads
to a depreciation, this will increase inflation. The more the central bank increases the
interest rate, the more it increases the probability of default on government debt, and
the more currency depreciates, the more inflation increases.
9II.2. An Overview of the Turkish Economy
In order to examine the effects of weak fiscal conditions on the monetary dynamics,
the economy, of which we would use the indicators, should have been suffering from
inflation, with high interest rates, bad debt structure and high risk premium. For
almost 15 years, the Turkish economy has an unsustainable level of real interest rates
along with high level of debt-gdp ratio, and of course high risk premium. Therefore it
is plausable to use the data of the Turkish economy.
Over the last two decades, the structure of the Turkish economy was quite vulnerable,
suffering from high and unsustainable interest rates, mainly due to the pressure of the
gradually increasing domestic borrowing of the fiscal sector. This high level of interest
rates have almost always induced high risk premium. Under these circumstances it
must be mentioned also that the fragility of the banking system made the economy
always ready to new crises.
The economic policy was mainly standing on the debt-related financial sources to
close the financing gap, because the foreign direct investment was discouraged due to
the incomplete financial and institutional infrastructure. In these financial conditions,
the domestic banks were borrowing from the international markets in short maturities
and extending credit through opening foreign currency positions and accumulating
off-balance sheet repo items. This shortened the average maturity of the domestic
10
borrowing and made the financial stability the primary objective of the monetary
authority.
In the second half of the economy, “managed float” was adopted as an extension of
the financial stability, aiming to stabilize the real exchange rate. Interest rates were
determined by the market, and the public sector was becoming a net foreign debt
repayer. This time, the public sector could not generate enough primary surplus and
consequently accelerated the domestic borrowing requirement. This happened to be as
a pressure on the financial sector, and induced high real interest rates.
Through the end of 1990s, there has been an accumulation of pressure on the economy
mainly because of the chronicle budget deficit problem. After the 1998 Russian crisis
and the earthquake in 1999, the inflation rate was 68 percent, and fiscal sector
borrowing requirement including duty losses reached 29 percent, which was the
double of the average of last ten years. The ratio of domestic debt to GDP increased to
42 percent, which was the triple of the average. At this point, a new economic
program had been started to decrease inflation and reduce the debt stock to a
sustainable level, supported by some structural reforms. At the beginning of the
program, interest rates fell very rapidly, due to the already gained credibility. This
caused capital inflows, and together with the inflationary dynamics, exchange rate
appreciated, leading an expansion of the current account deficits. Structural reforms
could not been applied totally, and with the lack of supervision and regulation in the
banking sector, economy started to go to a bad equilibrium again. The uncertainties
11
about the commitment to the economic program influenced the expectations, caused a
highly risky environment, and, in the end, the economy was in a severe crisis in
February 2001.
A new economic program for strengthening the Turkish economy was adopted,
applying a floating exchange rate regime. This new program was intending serious
structural changes in the economy. After the adoption of floating exchange rate
regime, Central Bank managed to bring the inflation down. This success was crucial
for regaining the credibility in the economy. However, in spite of the existence of an
independent monetary authority, inflation never fell to a desirable level under the
hesitations about the sustainability of the fiscal policy.
This brief analysis of the Turkish economy seems to be evidence on how the eroded
fiscal conditions prevent the success of the monetary policy. In order to see the whole
picture, we will now look at the debt structure of Turkish economy.
II.3. Debt Structure of Turkey
The debt stock of the Turkish economy mostly consists of short-term debt, mainly
indexed to inflation and financial assets. This relationship brings the debt stock
management to the center of attention. Basically, the vulnerable debt structure
12
diminishes the effectiveness of the monetary policy through making the future
expectations more sensitive.
Considering the high portion of the short-term debt stock, financing requirement of
treasury becomes quite intense. This, of course, requires high debt service and leads to
increased fragility of the domestic debt structure. Thus, when the economy faces with
any shock, demand for government securities falls and via expectations of
monetization of debt, risk of default rises, inducing a pressure on exchange rate and
interest rate.
13
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
As mentioned above, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of fiscal
constraints on pursuing monetary policy from the perspective of the risk premium. We
choose the Turkish economy as our case study and the conclusions are based on the
estimations on this data. Therefore, we should introduce the estimation methodology
first.
III.1. How is the loss function for the Monetary Policy formed?
We can discuss the effect of fiscal policy on monetary dynamics by using loss
functions. We model an inflation-targeting policy regime using loss functions over
policy goals. In our loss functions, inflation targeting always involves an attempt to
minimize deviations of inflation from the explicit inflation target. In addition,
assuming the natural rate hypothesis, our inflation targeting loss functions also
consider the variability of real output. In other words, there is no necessary connection
14
between the specification of the loss function and the specification of an inflation-
targeting policy regime, other than inflation variability must enter with a non-
negligible weight (see Fischer, Stanley (1996), “Why Are Central Banks Pursuing
Long-Run Price Stability?”, King, Mervin A. (1996), “How Should Central Banks
Reduce Inflation?- Conceptual Issues”, Taylor, John B. (1996), “How Should
Monetary Policy Respond to Shocks While Maintaining Long-Run Price Stability –
Conceptual Issues”, Svensson, Lars E.O. (1996) “Commentary: How Should
Monetary Policy Respond to Shocks While Maintaining Long-Run Price Stability –
Conceptual Issues”). Thus, we interpret inflation targeting as consistent with a
conventional quadratic loss function, where in addition to the variability of inflation
around the inflation target, there is some weight on the variability of the output gap.
III.2. Monetary Policy Rule: Inflation Targeting
First, it must be said that by an (explicit) instrument rule, we mean that the monetary
policy instrument is expressed as an explicit function of available information. Classic
examples of instrument rules are the “McCallum rule” (1997, Issues in the Design of
Monetary Policy Rules) for the monetary base, or the “Taylor rule” for the federal
funds rate. However, by a targeting rule, we mean that the central bank is assigned to
minimize a loss function that is increasing in the deviation between a target variable
and the target level for this variable. The targeting rule, indeed, implies an implicit
instrument rule.
15
In the literature, the expressions “targeting variable xt”, or “having a target level x* for
variable xt” have two meanings. According to the first meaning, the expressions above
are used in the sense of “setting a target variable x”. Thus, “having a target” means
“using all relevant information to bring the target variable in line with the target”, or
more precisely to minimize some loss function over expected future deviations of the
target variable from the target level. For instance, the quadratic loss function
min Et ∑∞
=0τ
δτ (xt+τ - x*)2,
where δ, 0<δ<1, is a discount factor and Et denotes the expectations operator
conditional on information available in period t.
According to the second meaning, “targeting” and “targets” imply a particular
information restriction for the instrument rule, so that the instrument must only depend
on the gap between the target variable and the target level. Thus, the instrument rule is
restricted to be
A(L)it = B(L)( xt - x*),
where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L. According to the second
meaning, “responding only to xt - x*” seems more precise.
16
A targeting rule for a goal variable is equivalent to having an objective for this
variable. Similarly, a targeting rule for an intermediate target variable is equivalent to
having a loss function for this intermediate target variable, where the target level
sometimes is not constant but depends on current information. The targeting rule can
also be expressed as an equation of the target variable, so that the target level for the
intermediate target is an explicit function of available information.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) examine the policy objective of the central bank in a
broader fashion. The central bank objective function translates the behavior of the
target variables into a welfare measure to guide the policy choice. They assume that
this objective function is over the target variables, which are output gap, xt, and
inflation, πt. It takes the following form:
max – ½ Et (∑∞
=0i
 βi[αx 2t+i + π 2t+i]),
where the parameter α is the relative weight on output deviations. Since xt = yt – zt, the
loss function takes potential output zt as the target. It takes the inflation target as zero,
but there is no cost in terms of generality since inflation is expressed as a percent
deviation from trend.
17
They emphasize that although there has been a considerable progress in motivating
behavioral macroeconomic models from first principles, the same has not been true
about rationalizing the objectives of policy. During the past several years, there have
been some attempts to obtain a plausible formulation of the policy problem by taking
as the welfare criterion the utility of a representative agent within the model.
However, the models that are currently available do not seem to consider the
uncertainty that variability of inflation for lifetime financial planning and for business
planning. Another limitation is that, while the widely used representative agent
approach may be a reasonable way to motivate behavioral relationships, it happens to
be highly misleading as a guide to welfare analysis. Briefly, if some groups of people
suffer more in recessions than the others in an environment of incomplete insurance
and credit markets, then the utility of a hypothetical representative agent might not
provide an accurate measure of cyclical fluctuations in welfare.
With certain exceptions, the general approach to this issue is assuming the objective of
monetary policy as minimizing the squared deviations of output and inflation from
their respective target levels. However, Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford
(1998) and Woodford (1998) provide a formal justification for this approach. They
show that an equation like the one introduced above may be obtained as a quadratic
approximation of the utility based welfare function, so that the relative weight α, is a
function of the primitive parameters of the model. We will not focus on this issue of
considering welfare maximization in the context of designing the monetary policy.
18
Determining the target rate of inflation is a more immediate question. Another issue is
the relative weights assigned to output and inflation losses. The policy makers in the
U.S. argue that “price stability” should be the ultimate goal. However, what they
propose as price stability is the inflation rate at which inflation is no longer a public
concern. In practice, an inflation rate between one and three percent for an
industrilized economy seems to meet this definition. A further rearrangement for this
criterion is that the official price indices may be overstating the true inflation rate by a
percent or two, as argued by the Boskin Commission.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) discuss the policy problem in the context of policy
design under discretion or rules. Generally, the policy problem is to choose a time path
for the instrument it to manage time paths of the target variables xt and πt that
maximize the objective function presented above. This formulation indeed is in the
tradition of the classic Jan Tinbergen (1952) and Henri Theil (1961) “targets” and
“instruments” problem. The combination of quadratic loss and linear constraints yields
a certainty equivalent decision rule for the path of the instrument. The optimal
feedback rule, in general, relates the instrument to the state of the economy.
However, there is an important difference from the classic problem. The target
variables depend not only on the current policy, but also on the expectations about
future policy. So that, the output gap depends on the future path of the interest rate,
and, in turn, inflation depends on the current and expected future behavior of the
19
output gap. As originally emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1977), in this kind of
environment, credibility of future policy intentions becomes a critical issue. For
instance, a credible central bank that can signal the intent to maintain the inflation low
in the future, may be able to reduce inflation with a less cost than otherwise.
In this context, the policy makers have the issue of identifying whether it would be
desirable to make a credibility-enhancing commitment. This question brings us to the
comparison of optimal policy under discretion versus rules. A central bank applying
policy under discretion chooses the current interest rate by reoptimizing every period.
Any promises in the past do not bind the current policy. On the other hand, under a
rule, central bank chooses a plan for the path of the interest rates that it sticks forever.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler emphasize two critical points while comparing the policy
under discretion versus rules. The key distinction of the two policies is through the
standpoint credibility. It should be answered that whether the current comments
constrain the future course of policy in any credible way. In both cases, the optimal
outcome is a feedback rule that relates the policy instrument to the current state of the
economy. The approaches differ, however, in the implications of the relationship
between policy intentions and private sector beliefs. Under discretion, private sector
forms its expectations considering how the central bank adjusts policy, knowing that
the central bank is free to reoptimize every period. Therefore, considering the rational
expectations, the central bank has no incentive to change its plans in an unexpected
way. That’s why, in equilibrium, the policy under discretion is termed as “time
20
consistent”. On the contrary, under a rule, it is basically the binding commitment that
makes the policy believable in equilibrium.
Secondly, it is not that much easy to obtain a tightly specified policy rule that could be
offered for the use of policy makers with great confidence. However, it is seen to be
useful to work through the cases of both discretion and rules in order to develop a set
of normative guidelines for policy behavior. As mentioned by Taylor (1993), common
sense application of these guidelines may improve the performance of the monetary
policy.
III.3. Solving the optimal linear regulator problem (OLRP)
Minimization of the loss function introduced above is indeed solving an optimal linear
regulator problem. In this section, we present the solution of the OLRP.
The undiscounted OLRP is to maximize over choice of {ut} t=0∞ the following
objective function
∑∞
=0t
{xt’Rxt + ut’Qut},
subject to xt+1 = Axt + But, x0 given. Here, xt is an (n x 1) vector of state variables, ut is
a (k x 1) vector of control variables, R is a negative semidefinite symmetric matrix, Q
is a negative definite symmetric matrix, A is an (n x k) matrix. Sargent and Ljungqvist
21
(2000) guess that the value function is quadratic, V(x) = x’Px, where P is a negative
semidefinite symmetric matrix.
The Bellman equation becomes
x’Px = maxu { x’Rx + u’Qu + (Ax + Bu)’P (Ax + Bu) }.
The first order necessary condition for the maximum problem on the right side of the
equation is
(Q + B’PB)u = -B’Pax,
which implies the feedback rule for u:
u = -(Q + B’PB)-1B’Pax
or u = -Fx, where
F = (Q + B’PB)-1B’PA.
Substituting the optimizer into the right side of the equation and rearranging gives
P = R + A’PA – A’PB(Q + B’PB)-1B’PA.
22
The above form is called “algebraic matrix Riccati equation” and it expresses the
matrix P as an implicit function of the matrices R, Q, A, B. In MATLAB, to obtain the
optimum values of the coefficients of the state variables, the loss function (or indeed
the return function multiplied by minus one) we use is as follows:
xt’Rxt + ut’Qut + 2ut’Wut.
As stated by Sargent and Ljungqvist under particular conditions, which we will omit
here, the matrix Riccati equation has a unique negative semidefinite solution, which is
approached in the limit as j → ∞ by the following iterations:
Pj+1 = R + A’PjA – A’PjB(Q + B’PjB)-1B’PjA,
Starting from P0 = 0, where the regarding policy function is
Fj+1 = (Q + B’P jB)-1B’P jA.
The discounted optimal linear regulator problem is to maximize
∑∞
=0t
βt{xt’Rxt + ut’Qut},                 0 < β < 1,
23
subject to xt+1 = Axt + But, x0 given. This problem leads to the following matrix
Riccati difference equation modified for discounting:
Pj+1 = R + βA’PjA – β2A’PjB(Q + βB’PjB)-1B’PjA.
The algebraic matrix Riccati equation is modified correspondingly. The value function
for the infinite horizon problem is simply V(x0) = x’0Px0, where P is the limiting value
of Pj resulting from iterations on equation above, starting from P0 = 0. The optimal
policy is ut = -Fxt, where F = β(Q + βB’P jB)-1B’P jA.
We use the Matlab program olrp.m, which can be found in the appendix, to solve
the discounted optimal linear regulator problem.
III.4. The Stochastic Case
The stochastic discounted linear optimal regulator problem is to choose a decision for
ut to maximize
E0∑∞
=0t
βt{xt’Rxt + ut’Qut},                 0 < β < 1,
Subject to x0 given, and the law of motion
24
xt+1 = Axt + But + εt+1,                        t>=0,
where εt+1 is an (nx1) vector of random variables that is independently and identically
distributed through time and obeys the normal distribution with mean vector zero and
covariance matrix
E εtεt’ = Σ.
The matrices R, Q,A, and B obey the assumption that we have described before.
The value function for this problem is
V(x) = x’Px + d,
where P is the unique negative semidefinite solution of the discounted algebraic
matrix Riccati equation corresponding to the Riccati equation described above. As
before, it is the limit of iterations starting from P0 = 0. The scalar d is given by
d = β(1- β)-1trP Σ
where “tr” stands for the trace of a matrix. Furthermore, the optimal policy continues
to be given by ut = -Fxt, where
25
F = β(Q + βB’PB)-1B’PA.
A notable feature of this solution is that this feedback rule is identical with the rule for
the corresponding nonstochastic optimal linear regulator problem. This outcome is the
certainty equivalence principle.
Certainty equivalence principle states that the feedback rule that solves the stochastic
optimal linear regulator problem is identical with the rule for the corresponding
nonstochastic optimal linear regulator problem.
Proof: Substitute value function given above into the Bellman equation to obtain
V(x) = max{x’Rx + u’Qu + βE[(Ax + Bu + ε)’P (Ax + Bu + ε)] + βd},
where ε is the realization of εt+1 when xt = x and when Eε|x = 0. The preceding
equation implies
V(x) = max{x’Rx + u’Qu + βE{x’A’PAx + x’A’PBu + x’A’Pε + u’B’Pax + u’B’Pbu
+ u’B’Pε + ε’Pax + εPBu + ε’Pε} + βd}.
Evaluating the expectations inside the braces and using Eε|x = 0 gives
V(x) = max{x’Rx + u’Qu + βx’A’Pax + β2x’A’Pbu + βu’B’Pbu + βEε’Pε} + βd.
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The first-order condition for u is
(Q + βB’PB)u = -βB’PAx,
which is the feedback rule presented above. Using Eε’Pε = trEε’Pε = trPEεε’ = trPΣ,
substituting the feedback rule into the preceding expression for v(x) gives
P = R + βA’PA – β2A’PB(Q + βB’PB)-1B’PA,
and
d = β(1- β)-1trPΣ.
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CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATION
IV.1. The Model
In order to analyze the fiscal constraint on monetary policy, we introduce two equation
systems. The first one consists of the following two equations:
πt+1 = α1πt + α2πt-1 + α3πt-2 + α4πt-3 + α5yt + εt+1
yt+1 = β1yt + β2yt-1 – β3(it’ - πt’) + ut+1,
where πt is the monthly inflation; πt’ is the inflation of the last four months, i.e., ¼
∑
=
−
3
0j
jtπ ; it is the monthly interest rate announced by Central Bank in percentage points
at an annual rate; it’ is the average interest rate of the last four months, i.e., ¼ ∑
=
−
3
0j
jti ;
yt is the relative gap between actual real GDP and potential GDP.
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The first equation relates inflation to a lagged output gap and to lags of inflation. The
second equation relates the output gap to its own lags and to the difference between
the average funds rate and average inflation over the previous four months. The third
term is a simple representation of the monetary transmission mechanism.
We will use the Embi spread as the risk premium. While the empirical evidence
consistently shows that one of the main determinants of emerging market spreads are
international factors, there are different views about these factors. Kamin and von
Kleist (1999) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000) report a negative relationship
between the level of long term US interest rates and spreads. Arora and Cerisola
(2001) find that the stance and predictability of US monetary policy are also
significant in determining capital market conditions in emerging markets. Herrera and
Perry (2002) consider both the importance of monetary policy and of the US corporate
bond spreads and allow for different long and short run effects, strengthening the
evidence on the importance of international factors.
The second equation system consists of the following five equations:
πt+1 = α1πt + α2πt-1 + α3πt-2 + α4πt-3 + α5yt + α6qt + εt+1
yt+1 = β1yt + β2yt-1 – β3(it - πt) + ut+1
qt+1 = γ1qt + γ2prt + γ3it + µt+1
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prt+1 = ψ1prt + ψ2
tGDP
Debt  + ξt+1
1+tGDP
Debt  = Ф1
tGDP
Debt  + Ф2it + φt+1
In addition to the first equation system, the second one includes three more equations,
providing the effect of fiscal constraint to be examined on the monetary policy. The
third equation relates real exchange rate, qt, to its lagged value, to the risk premium,
prt, which is taken as Embi spread, and to the interest rate, it. The fourth equation
relates risk premium to its lagged value and to the ratio of debt to GDP. The fifth
equation relates the ratio of Debt/GDPt to its lagged value and the interest rate.
IV.2. The Optimizers
We interpret inflation targeting as having a loss function for monetary policy, where
deviations from an explicit inflation target are given some weight. Our period loss
function is
Lt = πt’2 + ayt2 + b(it – it-1)2,
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where πt and πt’ are now interpreted as the deviation from a constant given inflation
target, and a >= 0 and b >= 0 are the weights on output stabilization and interest rate
smoothing, respectively. The variables appearing in the loss function are referred as
the goal variables.
Our model has the following state-space representation,
Xt+1 = AXt + Bit + vt+1.
The first equation system has the 9x1 vector Xt of state variables, the 9x9 matrix A,
the 9x1 column vector B, and the 9x1 column disturbance vector vt as follows:
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















−
−
−
−
−
−
−
3
2
1
1
3
2
1
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
i
i
i
y
y
π
π
π
π
, A = 


















−++
+∑ =
8
7
0
5
9:7362514:13
3
2
1
4
1 5
e
e
e
e
eeee
e
e
e
ee
j yjj
ββββ
αα
, B = 


















−
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
3β , vt = 
















0
0
0
0
0
0
0
t
t
u
ε
.
The second equation system has the following state-space representation:
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According to the solution of the Matlab code olrp.m, the optimal coefficients of the
state variables are obtained for the two equation systems. We minimize the loss
functions in case of flexible inflation targeting, strict inflation targeting, and output
targeting according to the coefficients of the loss function.
IV.3. Estimation Results
The estimated equations of the first equation system, using the sample period 2001:06
to 2004:06, are shown below:
πt+1 = 275.8 + 1.46πt - 0.49πt-1 – 0.07πt-2 + 0.07πt-3 + 0.4yt + εt+1
R-squared = 0.99, Durbin-Watson = 1.96,
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yt+1 = -8.5 + 1.7yt – 0.93yt-1 – 0.0012(it’ - πt’) + ut+1
R-squared = 0.96, Durbin-Watson = 1.33.
The estimated equations of the second equation system are as follows:
πt+1 = 252.8 + 1.49πt - 0.51πt-1 - 0.02πt-2 + 0.02πt-3 + 0.43yt - 1.27qt + εt+1
R-squared = 0.99, Durbin-Watson = 1.99
yt+1 = -8.53 + 1.7yt - 0.93yt-1 – 0.0012(it’ - πt’) + ut+1
R-squared = 0.96, Durbin-Watson = 1.33
qt+1 = -3.11 + 0.51qt + 0.01prt - 0.13it + µt+1
R-squared = 0.28, Durbin-Watson = 1.99
prt+1 = -170 + 0.97prt + 2.3
tGDP
Debt  + ξt+1
R-squared = 0.85, Durbin-Watson = 1.67
1+tGDP
Debt  = 13.3 + 0.9
tGDP
Debt  - 0.11it + φt+1
R-squared = 0.79, Durbin-Watson = 0.39
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IV.4. Interpretation of the estimation results for the inflation and output gap
equation:
First System:
When the coefficients of the inflation equation are analyzed, it cannot be rejected that
the sum of the coefficients regarding the lagged values of inflation sum to unity. Such
a finding implies the existence of an “inflation inertia”. Another important result is the
inflationary effect of the output gap: excess demand pressures lead to an increase in
the price level, which is consistent with a Phillips curve explanation.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the output gap equation seem
reasonable. It can be seen that the monetary policy operates expectedly: an increase in
the real interest rate, which is possible by increasing the policy instrument more than
the increase in inflation, reduces output gap. Such a finding is consistent with a
“Taylor type” monetary policy rule.
Second System:
When the second system of equations is analyzed, the inclusion of the exchange rate in
the inflation equation implies the existence of a high degree of exchange rate pass-
through. The depreciation of the domestic currency increases both the imported final
goods and the intermediate goods that are used in the production process. Such a high
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degree of exchange rate pass-through is not surprising and shows the existence of
“indexation” for most of the emerging markets: when the initial rate of inflation is
high, agents in the economy views the changes in the exchange rate as some kind of an
“anchor”. When the equation for the exchange rate is observed, some unconventional
results are obtained. For example, an increase in the EMBI spread leads to
appreciation. This finding is explained only if the investors have increasing incentives
to take risks for the observed sample period. On the other hand, the uncovered interest
rate parity condition works unexpectedly. Such a finding is also common when the
emerging markets are analyzed. Finally, when the risk premium equation is observed,
we see that, as expected, an increase in the debt to GDP ratio leads to a more than one-
to-one increase in the risk premium.
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CHAPTER V
OPTIMAL RULES UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES
V.1. Flexible inflation targeting
In case of flexible inflation targeting, the loss function according to the regarding
coefficients is
Lt = πt’2 + yt2 + 0.5(it – it-1)2.
First, in the case of two equations, in other words when there is no fiscal constraint,
the feedback rule is
i = 1.1095πt – 0.5633πt-1 + 0.0056πt-2 + 0.0823πt-3 + 1.8357yt – 2.0376yt-1 + 0.916it-1 –
0.0019it-2 – 0.0009it-3
The feedback rule in the case of imposing a fiscal constraint is
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i = -2.1041πt + 1.0768πt-1 - 0.0015πt-2 - 0.0436πt-3 - 4.4355yt + 3.7745yt-1 + 5.226qt +
0.3256prt + 1.7759
tGDP
Debt + 0.4518it-1 + 0.0023it-2 – 0.0012it-3
After the optimization is performed via optimal linear regulator problem with the
weights given above, two “interest rate rules” are obtained: one for the economy
without any fiscal constraints and the other one with the debt burden.
When the first rule is observed, it can be seen that the interest rate responds less
agressively to inflation. However, such a finding can be seen as a sign of
accommodative policy since we observe that interest rates also decrease due to an
increase in the output gap. However, the sum of the coefficients is around –0.21,
which implies that the optimal policy requires a slight response of interest rates to
demand pressures. Finally, and not surprisingly, we see that the interest rates follow
rather an autoregressive process: the coefficient of the lagged interest rate is close to
unity.
The results become much more important when the fiscal fundamentals are added to
the system as additional constraints. In this case, the optimal policy changes
significantly. The interest rates and the inflation is negatively related, providing
support for the arguments of Blanchard (2003) and Favero and Giavazzi (2003). If the
interest rates increase due to an increase in the inflation, then it is possible to observe
some kind of a “prize puzzle”, where increased interest rates actually lead to an
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increase in the risk perceptions of the investors, and result in a depreciation of the
domestic currency. Given that there is a high degree of exchange rate pass-through, a
depreciation of the currency actually leads to an increase in the price level. The
argument of the response of the interest rates to output gap remains largely the same.
Besides, we obtain a positive relation between exchange rate and the interest rate: an
appreciation of the currency leads to an increase in the interest rate, possibly by an
increased demand for the domestic currency. Also, both the coefficients regarding the
debt to GDP stock and the risk premium lead to an increase in the interest rates, as
expected.
V.2. Strict inflation targeting
The following loss function is minimized in case of strict inflation targeting.
Lt = πt’2 + 0.5yt2 + 0.5(it – it-1)2.
The feedback rule without a fiscal constraint is as follows:
i = 1.1110πt – 0.5642πt-1 + 0.0057πt-2 + 0.0824πt-3 + 1.8852yt – 2.0526yt-1 + 0.916it-1 –
0.0019it-2 – 0.0009it-3
The feedback rule in case of adding the fiscal constraint is as follows:
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i = -2.1044πt + 1.0769πt-1 - 0.0016πt-2 - 0.0436πt-3 - 4.4617yt + 3.8069yt-1 + 5.227qt +
0.3257prt + 1.7758
tGDP
Debt + 0.4519it-1 + 0.0023it-2 – 0.0012it-3
When we perform the optimization of the loss function presented above, we obtain
these two feedback rules, where the second one has a fiscal constraint.
Actually, the rule of strict inflation targeting is more or less the same with the one
obtained in flexible inflation targeting. Again, the response of inflation is greater in
case of having weak fiscal conditions than of ignoring the fiscal constraint. Also the
total effect of output gap on interest rate is still negative with a coefficient of  -0.17.
Finally, as the coefficients of the lagged variables of interest rate remained unchanged,
the interest rates still follow an autoregressive process.
Addition of fiscal constraints results in a feedback rule very similar to that of flexible
inflation targeting. Interest rates respond inflation negatively and with a greater
coefficient. Therefore, in case of high inflation, an increase in interest rates induces
high risk premium, and in turn causes depreciation, where in most emerging markets
depreciation triggers inflation. In strict inflation targeting, the negative effect of output
gap remains almost the same. Also as in flexible inflation targeting, an appreciation
leads to higher interest rates most probably due to an increase in the demand of
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domestic currency. Finally, not surprisingly, risk premium and debt-to-GDP ratio have
positive effects on interest rates.
Consequently, either in “flexible” or ”strict” form, inflation targeting regimes produce
similar results when fiscal constraints are accounted for. Such a result implies that, in
case of weak fiscal conditions, there is not much importance of the monetary policy.
V.3. Output targeting
In case of output targeting, the greatest coefficient is given to the output gap and the
follwing loss function is minimized:
Lt = πt’2 + 2yt2 + (it – it-1)2.
The feedback rule obtained when there is no fiscal constraint is
i = 0.6796πt – 0.3451πt-1 + 0.0034πt-2 + 0.0504πt-3 + 1.0699yt – 1.2005yt-1 + 0.934it-1 –
0.0011it-2 – 0.0005it-3
When we impose the fiscal constraints under output targeting the following rule is
obtained:
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i = -1.4204πt + 0.7308πt-1 - 0.0013πt-2 - 0.0295πt-3 - 2.9230yt + 2.4942yt-1 + 3.595qt +
0.2572prt + 1.5904
tGDP
Debt + 0.4829it-1 + 0.0015it-2 + 0.0008it-3
In output targeting policy regime, when we look at the loss function, the coefficient of
output gap is greater than the coefficients of inflation and interest rate smoothing.
According to the first system of equations, it is apparently seen that the response of
inflation and output gap became weaker in case of output targeting. Inflation has still a
positive effect on interest rate, but less aggressively. The negative total response of
output gap to interest rate remains almost the same with a coefficient of –0.13. Also as
the coefficient of lagged interest rate is still close to unity, interest rates seem to have
an autoregressive process.
The most important consequence of addition of fiscal constraints, as seen in the
flexible and strict inflation targeting, is the negative and more aggressive response of
inflation to interest rate. This negative relation occurs again through the channel of
high risk premium and depreciation causing inflation when the interest rates increase
in case of weak fiscal conditions. Output gap responds negatively as in the cases of
inflation targeting. Also, appreciation induces an increase in the interest rates due to
the increased demand for domestic currency. However, this response of the change of
real exchange rate parity stays rather smaller when compared to the cases of flexible
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and strict inflation targeting. Finally, as expected, there is positive response of risk
premium and debt-to-GDP ratio in case of output targeting too.
V.4. Comparison of Interest Rates
These three targeting policy regimes reflect the differences by coefficients in their
feedback rules. When we look at the flexible and strict inflation targeting feedback
rules, we see a very small difference. This small difference appears to be the slightly
higher absolute effect of output gap on interest rate in the strict inflation targeting than
that of the flexible targeting policy regime. However, output targeting policy regime
has some clearer distinctions. In the case of giving a higher weight on output gap, the
effect of inflation on interest rate apparently decreases. In fact, this decrease appears
also in the effects of output gap, real exchange rate, risk premium, and debt-to-GDP
ratio.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The model and the empirical work yield a clear conclusion that in case of weak fiscal
conditions, an increase in the interest rate leads to even a higher inflation than the
previous one. This situation totally contradicts with what the traditional methods
suggest. In general, an increase in the interest rate leads to a decrease in inflation
through two channels. First, the higher interest rate decreases demand, output, and in
turn, inflation. Second, the higher interest rate leads to an exchange rate appreciation.
The appreciation decreases inflation, both directly, and indirectly through the induced
decrease in demand and output. However, there is a perverse effect of increasing the
interest rate under a fiscal constraint. This effect calls into question the logic of
inflation targeting, where the interest rate responds positively to inflation. If in
response to inflation, the monetary authority increases the interest rate, and the interest
rate leads to a depreciation, finally this will increase inflation. The more the central
bank increases the interest rate, the more it increases the risk premium,and the more
the currency depreciates, the more inflation increases.
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We used the data of Turkish economy due to the fact that it has a rather high risk
premium and debt burden. We compared the interest rate feedback rules obtained with
and without a fiscal constraint. We solved the optimal linear regulator problem in
order to obtain the feedback rules in both cases. When there is no fiscal constraint we
observe the positive relationship between the interest rate and inflation. Also we see
the negative response of output gap. Another consequence of the first rule is that the
interest rates follow an autoregressive process.
When the fiscal fundementals are added, the optimal policy rule changes significantly.
In case of having fiscal constraints, the policy rule supports our claim so that we
observe a negative response of interest rate to inflation. When the monetary authority
increases interest rate due to an increase in inflation, this will lead to an increase in the
risk perceptions of the investors, and result in a depreciation of the domestic currency.
Assuming that there is a high degree of exchange rate pass-through,  this depreciation
leads to inflation. The response of interest rate to output gap is negative on the
aggregate again. Finally, both the debt-to-GDP ratio and the risk premium lead to an
increase in the interest rates.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: EMBI Spread between June 2001 and June 2004
Figure 2: Percentage of Debt/GDP between June 2001 and June 2004
Figure 3: Monthly inflation between June 2001 and June 2004
EMBI Spread
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
2001:06 - 2004:06
EM
B
I S
pr
ea
d
Series1
Percentage of Debt/GDP
-
20,00
40,00
60,00
80,00
100,00
120,00
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
2001:06 - 2004:06
D
eb
t/G
D
P 
%
Series1
Monthly Inflation
-0,01
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
2001:06 - 2004:06
In
fla
tio
n 
R
at
e
Series1
47
Figure 4: Inflation based real exchange rate between June 2001 and June 2004
MATLAB CODES
Matlab code for flexible inflation targeting without a fiscal constraint
beta = 1;
A = [1.46 -0.49 -0.07 0.07 0.40 0 0 0 0;
     1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 1.7 -0.93 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004;
     0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0]
 B = [0;0;0;0;-0.0004;0;1;0;0]
 Q = -1*[1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/8 1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0;
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      0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
  R = -0.5
  W = [0;0;0;0;0;0;0.5;0;0]
%function [f,p] = olrp(beta,A,B,Q,R,W)
%function [f,p] = olrp(beta,A,B,Q,R,W)
%%OLRP can have arguments: (beta,A,B,Q,R) if there are no cross products
%     (i.e. W=0).  Set beta=1, if there is no discounting.
%
%     OLRP calculates f of the feedback law:
%
% u = -fx
%
%  that maximizes the function:
%
%          sum {beta^t [x'Qx + u'Ru +2x'Wu] }
%
%  subject to
% x[t+1] = Ax[t] + Bu[t]
%
%  where x is the nx1 vector of states, u is the kx1 vector of controls,
%  A is nxn, B is nxk, Q is nxn, R is kxk, W is nxk.
%
%    Also returned is p, the steady-state solution to the associated
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%  discrete matrix Riccati equation.
%
m=max(size(A));
[rb,cb]=size(B);
if nargin==5; W=zeros(m,cb); end;
if min(abs(eig(R)))>1e-5;
  A=sqrt(beta)*(A-B*(R\W'));
  B=sqrt(beta)*B;
  Q=Q-W*(R\W');
  [k,s]=doubleo(A',B',Q,R);
  f=k'+(R\W');
  p=s;
else;
  p0=-.01*eye(m);
  dd=1;
  it=1;
  maxit=1000;
  % check tolerance; for greater accuracy set it to 1e-10
  while (dd>1e-6 & it<=maxit);
    f0=   (R+beta*B'*p0*B)\(beta*B'*p0*A+W');
    p1=beta*A'*p0*A + Q -(beta*A'*p0*B+W)*f0;
    f1=   (R+beta*B'*p1*B)\(beta*B'*p1*A+W');
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    dd=max(max(abs(f1-f0)));
    it=it+1;
    p0=p1;
  end;
  f=f1;p=p0;
  if it>=maxit; disp('WARNING: Iteration limit of 1000 reached in OLRP'); end;
end;
f
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Matlab code for flexible inflation targeting with a fiscal constraint
beta = 1;
A = [1.49 -0.51 -0.02 0.02 0.43 0 -1.27 0 0 0 0 0;
     1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 1.7 -0.93 0 0 0 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003;
     0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0.51 0.013 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.97 2.3 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0;
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0]
 B = [0;0;0;0;-0.0003;0;-0.013;0;-0.11;1;0;0]
 Q = -1*[1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      1/8 1/8 1/8 1/16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
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      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
  R = -0.5
  W = [0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0.5;0;0]
%function [f,p] = olrp(beta,A,B,Q,R,W)
%function [f,p] = olrp(beta,A,B,Q,R,W)
%%OLRP can have arguments: (beta,A,B,Q,R) if there are no cross products
%     (i.e. W=0).  Set beta=1, if there is no discounting.
%
%     OLRP calculates f of the feedback law:
%
% u = -fx
%
%  that maximizes the function:
%
%          sum {beta^t [x'Qx + u'Ru +2x'Wu] }
%
%  subject to
% x[t+1] = Ax[t] + Bu[t]
%
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%  where x is the nx1 vector of states, u is the kx1 vector of controls,
%  A is nxn, B is nxk, Q is nxn, R is kxk, W is nxk.
%
%    Also returned is p, the steady-state solution to the associated
%  discrete matrix Riccati equation.
%
m=max(size(A));
[rb,cb]=size(B);
if nargin==5; W=zeros(m,cb); end;
if min(abs(eig(R)))>1e-5;
  A=sqrt(beta)*(A-B*(R\W'));
  B=sqrt(beta)*B;
  Q=Q-W*(R\W');
  [k,s]=doubleo(A',B',Q,R);
  f=k'+(R\W');
  p=s;
else;
  p0=-.01*eye(m);
  dd=1;
  it=1;
  maxit=1000;
  % check tolerance; for greater accuracy set it to 1e-10
  while (dd>1e-6 & it<=maxit);
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    f0=   (R+beta*B'*p0*B)\(beta*B'*p0*A+W');
    p1=beta*A'*p0*A + Q -(beta*A'*p0*B+W)*f0;
    f1=   (R+beta*B'*p1*B)\(beta*B'*p1*A+W');
    dd=max(max(abs(f1-f0)));
    it=it+1;
    p0=p1;
  end;
  f=f1;p=p0;
  if it>=maxit; disp('WARNING: Iteration limit of 1000 reached in OLRP'); end;
end;
f
